Tax Incentives & Credit Claiming in Single-Party Regimes: Vietnam, China & Russia

Tax Incentives & Credit Claiming in Single-Party Regimes: Evidence from Vietnam, China & Russia
Dr. Eddy Malesky, Duke University

Both countries and sub-national governments commonly engage in competition for mobile capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. While suggesting such incentives allow politicians in democracies to take credit for firms’ investment decisions or escape blame if firms do not come, this seminar will present the strong empirical finding that authoritarian countries offer greater tax incentives to foreign investors than their democratic counterparts, both in terms of variety and size of the reductions. Using cross-national and firm-level data from Russia and Vietnam, Dr. Malesky will also discuss what conditions the authoritarian anomaly and generates the upward accountability.

Eddy Malesky, PhD is an associate professor of political economy at Duke University. He has published in leading political science and economic journals, including the American Political Science Review and Journal of Politics, and has been awarded the Harvard Academy Fellowship and Gabriel Almond Award for best dissertation in comparative politics. Dr. Malesky serves as the lead researcher for the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index and is a noted specialist in the political development in Vietnam and China, comparative political economy in Southeast Asia, as well as economic transitions in developing economies.

Sponsored by Centre for Southeast Asia Research (CSEAR), Centre for Chinese Research (CCR) & Liu Institute for Global Issues

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